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SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE NEW
SUPREME COURT: THE FUTURE OF
PRESIDENTIAL EXPRESSION
ANNE SKRODZKI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

During a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on presidential
signing statements, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy warned,
"[we] are at a pivotal moment in our Nation's history, where
Americans are faced with a President who makes sweeping claims
for almost unchecked Executive power."' With parties as diverse
as Senators,2 the American Bar Association,' newspaper editorial
pages,4 and internet bloggers5 weighing in on the subject,
* Anne is a May 2008 J.D. candidate at The John
Marshall Law School
and a Lead Articles Editor of The John Marshall Law Review. She wishes to
thank the Editorial Board of The John Marshall Law Review for their
friendship and support, her friends Geraldine Gonzales and Erica Byrd for
inspiration and encouragement, and her family for their guidance and love.
1. The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Ranking Member, Judiciary Comm.).
2. See, e.g., Senator Patrick Leahy, Remarks on the Nomination of Samuel
A. Alito, Jr., to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, at The Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 19, 2006)
(characterizing President Bush's use of signing statement as a "power grab");
Senator Dianne Feinstein, Remarks to the Queen's Bench Bar Association
(May 30, 2006) (criticizing the current administration's use of signing
statements as "disrupting the checks and balances so fundamental to our
particular form of democracy").
3. See Report, American Bar Association, Task Force on Presidential
Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine (July 24, 2006)
(calling for the elimination of signing statements that interpret legislation
differently from the stated intent of Congress).
4. Walter Dellinger, Op-Ed., A Slip of the Pen, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006,
§ A, at 17 (defending a President's authority to issue signing statements in
which he makes constitutional challenges to the validity of the relevant
legislation); Nat Hentoff, Op-Ed., Sweet Land of Liberty, WASH. TIMES, July
10, 2006, § A, at 19 (warning that the President's use of signing statements
indicates that he has an expansive view of executive power and threatens to
negate the power of Congress). Additionally, a series of stories covering
President Bush's use of signing statements was awarded the 2006 Pulitzer
Prize for national reporting. David Mehegan, Globe Writer Wins Pulitzer for
National Reporting, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al.
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President George W. Bush's signing statements are making news
as never before.
While signing statements have defenders as well as
detractors, most commentators have strongly criticized George W.
Bush for both the frequency and the content of the statements he
has issued.6 However, these critics have not considered that the
challenges issued by President Bush may have little or no actual
impact on the practical application of the relevant legislation.
Additionally, signing statements have legitimate beneficial uses.
As published records of a President's interpretation of legislation,
they serve to clarify and communicate the executive branch's
understanding of congressional action.7
In order to contextualize the current use and impact of
signing statements, Part II of this Comment will address the
history of the presidential signing statement, focusing on the last
twenty-five years. Part II will also examine the recent attention
paid to signing statements and their connection to the current U.S
Supreme Court. Part III will analyze two distinct issues that
illustrate the impact that presidential signing statements have on
the Supreme Court: affirmative action and subject matter
jurisdiction over detainees. Legislation addressing both of these
issues passed with George W. Bush attaching signing statements,
and the Supreme Court has issued decisions addressing those
statements. Finally, Part IV will propose that signing statements
continue to be issued, and that courts use them as one of many
tools of interpretation, with appropriate legislation providing for
immediate judicial review in some circumstances. These measures
will preserve the balance between the legitimate power of the
President and proper deference to the other branches of
government.

5. See Posting of Ask a Lobbyist to http://www.wonkette.com/ politics/aska-lobbyist/ask-a-lobbyist-ruining-our-country-201969.php
(Sept. 20, 2006,
14:44 EST) (contending that presidential signing statements are ineffective at
promoting a specific position).
6. Editorial, PresidentialSigning Statements, N.J. LAW., Aug. 21, 2006, at
6; Joe Wolverton II, Presidential Power Grab: President Bush Has Been
Quietly Attaching Pronouncements to the Bills He Signs Into Law, NEW AM.,
Aug. 21, 2006, at 25; Editorial, Signings of the Times: An ABA Task Force
Warns of an Abuse of Power, PIrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 6, 2006, § H, at

2.
7. Signing statements have been included in the "Legislative History"

section of the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News
since 1986. However, they have also been released in the Weekly Compilation
of PresidentialDocuments by the White House Press Secretary since 1965.
Harvard Law School Library, Notable Internet Resources, http://www.law.
harvard.edu/library/services/research/nir/current-issue.php (last visited July
12, 2007).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. HistoricalContext
James Monroe published the first presidential signing
statement in the year 1817.8 When signing statements were
initially issued, Presidents used them to "raise and address the
legal or constitutional questions they believed were presented by
the legislation they were signing."9 Initially, Presidents used
signing statements sparingly, and with a few notable exceptions
the statements did not garner much attention.' ° No President
issued more than ten signing statements during his
administration until President Hoover, who issued twelve."
However, every President since Hoover has released at least fifty
signing statements, illustrating
their rise in popularity during the
2
mid to late twentieth century.1

8. Christopher S. Kelley, Dep't of Political Sci., Miami Univ., A
Comparative Look at the Constitutional Signing Statement: The Case of Bush
and Clinton, Presentation to the 61st Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association (Apr. 3-6, 2003), at 6-7. This first signing statement
issued by President Monroe concerned a law he had signed into effect which
reduced the size of the army and dictated the procedure which the President
would follow in selecting new officers. When he was criticized for not
appointing officers as Congress had mandated, Monroe issued a statement
which challenged the authority of Congress to dictate these procedures,
instead arguing that the Constitution afforded the President the sole
responsibility to appoint officers as he saw fit. Id.
9. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., to
Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with
the Department of Justice), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/olcsigning.htm.
10. Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential
Signing Statement, at Appendix 3.1 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Miami Univ. of Ohio) (on file with author), available at http://www.ohio
link.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?miami1057716977.
Two prominent examples of
early signing statements which were controversial at the time involve
Presidents Jackson and Tyler. Jackson, unhappy about a bill involving
internal road improvements, issued a statement that a road which was to
connect Detroit and Chicago should not extend past Michigan Territory.
Although Jackson was criticized, the road improvements were confined to
Michigan.

LOuIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS

AND THE PRESIDENT 128 (Univ. Press of Kan. 3d rev. ed. 1991) (1972). When
President Tyler attached a statement to a Congressional Districting Act, he
noted that he signed the bill in deference to Congressional authority rather
than from having his own strong opinions on the subject. Tyler was publicly
chastised by a Committee of the House of Representatives, which accused him
of having ulterior motives for speaking on the subject and concluded that the
statement was "a defacement of the public records and archives." H.R. REP.
NO. 909 (1842).

11. Kelley, supra note 10, at Appendix 3.1.
12. Id. Remember that Ford's presidency lasted for only three years, and
both Carter and George H.W. Bush served for only one term.
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The Reagan Administration

While the signing statement was used more frequently by
twentieth century Presidents, it was still a largely ceremonial and
unheralded method of presidential expression. Then, during the
presidency of Ronald Reagan, key members of the Administration
began to explore the possibility of using signing statements to
expand the President's influence over legislation by creating a
"parallel legislative history."' In February 1986, Attorney General
Edwin Meese gave a speech to the National Press Club on gun
control, during which he announced that all presidential signing
statements would be included in the Legislative History section of
the United States Code Congressional and Administrative News
(U.S.C.C.A.N).15 Although this statement was seemingly an
afterthought, the inclusion of the signing statement in
U.S.C.C.A.N gave it a powerful political legitimacy, and allowed it
to occupy a unique place in executive communication.
This
elucidated not only the President's position, but also extended the
position of 1the
entire executive branch - including the justice
6
department.
13. Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and the President's Authority to
Refuse to Enforce the Law, AM. CONST. SoC'Y, June 2006, at 2.
14. See Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., to The Litigation Strategy Working Group, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb. 5,
1986) (on file with the National Archives), available at http://www.archives.
gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269 (go to box 6; then follow first
hyperlink) (suggesting that signing statements be used in questions of
interpretation, and claiming that "the President's understanding of the bill
should be just as important as that of Congress"). This memorandum was
produced as part of a lengthy brainstorming process between members of the
justice department seeking to promote the principle of a "Unitary Executive."
Id. Although that concept is far too detailed to include a complete discussion
here, a general overview of the theory is that in a unitary executive system,
Presidents have all-encompassing executive power, including over officers and
agencies of the executive branch. Further, in a unitary executive system
Congress has a limited ability to interfere with a president's control of the
executive branch of the government, through legislation or other means.
There are generally three basic elements to a unitary executive system: first,
that the president has the power to remove bureaucratic policy-making
officials; second, that the president has the power to dictate the subordinate's
exercise of executive power; and third, that the president has the power to veto
any discretionary exercise of executive power by any subordinate official. See
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
Second Half-Century, 26 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 667, 668 (2003) (providing a
lengthy and detailed analysis of the unitary executive theory, especially as it
was implemented by several administrations in the second half of the
nineteenth century).
15. Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, PresidentialSigning Statement as
Interpretationsof Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power,
24 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 367 (1987).
16. Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive
Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 87 (2002).
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The George H.W. Bush and ClintonAdministrations

George H.W. Bush continued the practice of using signing
statements frequently, and issued only sixty-two fewer signing
statements in his first term than Reagan had produced in two. 7
The real test of the reach of signing statements, however, would
come under President Clinton. After three terms of Republican
leadership, Clinton proved that the signing statement was not a
His Assistant
feature exclusive to conservative leadership. 8
Attorney General wrote a memo reaffirming that the executive
office now considered signing statements a permanent fixture.' 9
Like Reagan and George H.W. Bush, Clinton used signing
statements to challenge the constitutionality of legislation and to
expand his executive power.20 He relied heavily on executive
actions after the midterm elections of 1994 gave Republicans
control of both houses of Congress.2'
3.

The George W. Bush Administration
George W. Bush has become the most prolific issuer of signing

17. Kelley, supra note 10, at 110.
18. See Christopher S. Kelley, Letter to the Editor, Correspondence, NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 11, 2006, at 4 (summarizing his scholarship in the history of
signing statements in refuting an article which characterized the rise of
signing statements as a conservative strengthening of executive power, and
asserting that scholarly research shows that President Clinton used signing
statements in much the same way as his conservative predecessors and
follower).
19. See Dellinger, supra note 9 (discussing and supporting the President's
authority to choose not to enforce statutes which he considers
unconstitutional). Dellinger's memo, although ultimately in favor of the use of
signing statements, cautions against the abuse of them. Id. He explicitly
states that if a President has reason to believe that the Supreme Court would
uphold the constitutionality of the disputed section of legislation, he should
execute the statute despite his own opinion on the subject. Id. He also
included a statement that although the President should give deference to
congressional action, he should use "his independent judgment" in deciding
whether or not a statute is unconstitutional. Id.
20. See Robert Pear, The PresidentialPen Is Still Mighty, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 1998, § 4, at 3 (contending that, even though the Supreme Court had just
ruled against the line item veto, Clinton had been expanding his executive
power through "executive orders, regulations, proclamations, and other
decrees"). One example of a Clinton signing statement that includes a direct
constitutional challenge can be found in the statement issued with the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1996. The bill included a provision that
HIV-positive service members would be discharged regardless of medical
necessity. Clinton signed the bill, but released a signing statement which
declared that the section was unconstitutional, and directed the Attorney
General to leave it undefended if the section was challenged. The Attorney
General was never called to act upon the matter, since Clinton worked with
Congress to repeal the section in question. Kelley, supra note 8, at 20.
21. Kelley, supra note 8, at 21.
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statements in history, as well as the most controversial. 2
Although to a certain extent he inherits the institutionalized
structure of his predecessors, he has certainly further expanded
the common usage of signing statements.2 Exact figures
documenting Bush's use of signing statements vary, but sources
agree that as of June 2007, he has issued about one hundred and
fifty signing statements, which contain over one thousand
constitutional challenges.24
President Bush issued one such statement on December 30,
2005, when he signed the Defense Department Budget into Law.
An amendment to that bill, known as the Detainee Treatment Act,
provided that enemy combatants under the control of the Justice
Department anywhere in the world would be protected from
mistreatment during interrogation.2 5 Bush's signing statement,
however, instructed the executive branch to construe this section
as consistent with his own powers as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces and as head of the executive branch.'
In other
words, Bush's statement contended that Congress did not have the
authority to direct the actions of members of the executive branch,
or to interfere with members of the military - a typical position
expressed in his signing statements. 7

22. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON
2006 (documenting hundreds of signing statements issued by
the current administration, as well as sharply criticizing the way that they are
issued and their content, which often contains constitutional challenges).
23. President Bush has issued signing statements on topics ranging from
affirmative action and government employee whistleblowing to detainee
torture and educational research. A recurring theme among Bush's signing
statements emphasizes that he does not recognize congressional authority to
direct his actions as head of the executive branch, and thus he objects to
congressional action which might encroach upon the separation of powers.
Charlie Savage, Examples of the President's Signing Statements, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 30,

GLOBE,

Apr. 30, 2006.

24. Letter from the United States Government Accountability Office to
Senator Robert C. Byrd and Representative John Conyers, Jr. (June 18, 2007)
[hereinafter GAO Report]. The ABA task force cites a Boston Globe article
that puts the number of constitutional challenges at over eight hundred in the
first six years of the Bush Administration. Savage, supra note 22. Some of
the confusion can be attributed to the fact that the President may challenge
more than one section of a bill within one signing statement.
25. Detainee Treatment Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-158, § 1002, 119 Stat.
2680 (2005).
26. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President's
Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006" (Dec. 30, 2005).
27. See GAO Report, supra note 24 (documenting President Bush's signing
statements and reporting that constitutional challenges contained therein
related to Congress's interference with the President's executive powers over
foreign affairs, as commander-in-chief, and as head of the executive branch).
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After a steady expansion in use over the course of almost one
hundred years, signing statements have become an entrenched
With a line-item veto
feature of presidential politics.28
have
used
them
in situations where the
unavailable, Presidents
benefits of a bill have outweighed a small objectionable section. 9
Increasingly, though, Presidents have issued signing statements
as a matter of course, publicly clarifying their position on
legislation while attempting to present the judiciary with a
possible alternate interpretation should any provision be
challenged.
B. Signing Statements and the U.S. Supreme Court Nominee
President Bush's signing statements attracted scrutiny when
he nominated Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to the U.S. Supreme Court. 0
Alito was one of the architects of the Reagan Administration's
This fact was not
expanded usage of signing statements.'
overlooked during the nomination process; several senators
remarked upon the connection between Alito and signing
statements, including one who theorized that as a member of the
Supreme Court Alito would support "a new and radical expansion
28. Savage, supra note 22.
29. Signing statements have been connected to the idea of an "item veto" as
early as the Jackson Administration. Fisher, supra note 10. However, most
comparisons of the signing statement and the line-item veto come out of the
Clinton Administration. The Line-Item Veto Act was passed in 1996, and was
used by President Clinton eleven times to remove eighty-two items from the
federal budget. National Archives and Records Administration, Cancellation
of Legislative Items Pursuant to Line Item Veto Act (Public Law 104-130),
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/nara004.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). The
Line-Item Veto Act was overturned by the Supreme Court in 1998. Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998). For two detailed accounts of the
line-item veto and its connection to signing statements, see Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 23, 30-33 (1995) (contending that expanded usage of executive orders and
signing statements has been able to subvert the structure of the government,
and that a line-item veto is needed to address the "omnibus" legislation that
Congress passes without resorting to executive tools that allow the President
to unilaterally dictate the interpretation of a particular act); Roy E. Brownell
II, Comment, The Unnecessary Demise of the Line Item Veto Act: The Clinton
Administration's Costly Failureto Seek Acknowledgment of "NationalSecurity
Recission," 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1273, 1338 (1998) (contending that Congress
cannot dictate to the executive branch in certain areas of spending, and in the
corresponding footnote arguing that Presidents have, at times, exercised a de
facto line item veto over non-appropriations bills by issuing signing
statements which limit the scope of the enacted legislation).
30. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, For President, Final Say on a Bill
Sometimes Comes After the Signing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, § A, at 1
(reporting on the signing statement that President Bush attached to the
McCain Torture Amendment, and then-nominee Alito's connection to signing
statements).
31. See Alito, supra note 14.
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of executive power."32 Alito's previous support of signing statements also garnered a wide variety of press coverage.33 Justice
Alito's nomination was confirmed by the Senate on January 31,
2006..
C. The American Bar Association Investigation
1.

Task Force Investigationand Report

After Alito's confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court, the
American Bar Association (ABA) decided to convene a task force to
investigate the current Administration's use of signing
statements.5 The task force was comprised of, among others, the
Dean of the Yale Law School, Harold Koh, and former Chief Judge
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Patricia Wald."
32. 152 CONG. REC. S145, 194 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Levin); see also 152 CONG. REC. S35, 50 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (opposing Alito's nomination and arguing that a President's
role in the legislative process is merely to either sign a bill or veto it, and that
the view that a president has an interpretational opinion of legislation that he
signs is "a very bizarre view of Executive Authority and Executive Power");
152 CONG. REC. S235, 245 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Dayton)
(speaking against Alito's confirmation and asserting that the practice of
issuing signing statement goes against the "very clear language" of the
Constitution). In addition to the debate of Alito's nomination on the floor of
the senate, some senators made public remarks regarding his history of
supporting signing statements and the use of signing statements by the Bush
Administration. Leahy, supra note 2; Feinstein, supra note 2.
33. For a sampling of press coverage of Alito's nomination and his
connection with signing statements, see Adam Liptak, Court in Transition:
The Legal Context, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, § A, at 11. Liptak explains the
background of Alito's connection to signing statements and reports Alito
distanced himself from that position during his confirmation hearings by
noting that his memorandum was assigned while he was part of a government
working group and did not necessarily reflect his personal opinions. Id. See
also Editorial, Still Time to Stop Alito Confirmation, ITHACA J., Jan. 21, 2006,
§ A, at 8 (accusing the President of being "power hungry" and using Alito as a
means to consolidate that power); John Jones, Op-Ed., Alito Confirmation a
Warning that Court is Moving Against Mainstream America's Wishes,
ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006, § A, at 7 (criticizing Alito's
confirmation and also containing a personal attack on the Justice, saying that
his support of signing statements during the Reagan Administration displays
"a deviousness not consistent with our generally accepted definition of 'good'
character").
34. 152 CONG. REC. S333, 385 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2006) (record of daily
confirmations).
35. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 3.
36. Id. at 29-34. Other notable members of the task force are former Dean
of Stanford Law School and current head of the Stanford Constitutional Law
Center Kathleen M. Sullivan, Harvard Law Professor Charles J. Ogletree, and
former Justice Department attorney Bruce Fein. The task force was chaired
by Neal R. Sonnet, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of Florida and prominent Miami attorney who specializes in the defense of
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The task force preliminarily released its findings and
recommendations in July 2006, and Senator Arlen Specter read
the full text of the news release into the Senate record.37 Although
the task force was careful to stress that their report was not a
specific attack on the Bush Administration, its section
documenting the Clinton Administration noted that Clinton and
his advisors recognized and deferred to Congress' authority, while
the following section documenting the Bush years sharply
criticized that Administration.3 8
The task force concluded that the President should neither
release signing statements that contain challenges to the
constitutionality of the legislation they accompany, nor indicate
that he intends to interpret the legislation in any way that is
inconsistent with the intent stated by Congress.39
The
constituency of the ABA adopted this recommendation at their
annual meeting in August, 2006.40
2. Legislation Introduced
Days after the ABA taskforce released its report, the
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee introduced
legislation that would instruct courts to disregard presidential
signing statements when interpreting legislation. 1 The bill, if
passed, would also provide that either house of Congress has

white collar criminals. Id.
37. 152 CONG. REC. S8122, 8123 (daily ed. July 24, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Specter). The news release contained the primary conclusions and recommendations of the task force and background information about the members
as well as the ABA. Id.
38. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 12-18.
39. Id. at 20.
40. Patricia Manson, ABA: Write Law on Signing Statements, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Aug. 9, 2006, at 10001. The task force report contained a number of
other recommendations which were also adopted.
These include communicating any reservations he has about the constitutionality of a bill to
Congress before the legislation is passed, using signing statements only to
communicate the "meaning, purpose, or significance" of the legislation that he
is signing, the passage of legislation that requires signing statements to be
readily available to the public as well as officially delivered to Congress, and
the passage of legislation that provides for immediate judicial review of issues
raised in signing statements in certain circumstances. ABA Task Force
Report, supra note 3, at 20-25.
41. S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006). The bill contains a number of findings,
including the contention that courts have begun to use signing statements as a
source of authority when attempting to interpret legislation. Id. It also
contends that the members of the Supreme Court are unable to agree on a
position in order to declare a clear rule regarding judicial reliance on signing
statements, and that this difference of opinion has the "unfortunate effect" of
unpredictable court procedures for interpreting federal legislation. Id. Specter
does not cite sources of authority for these findings, and has not thus far been
able to attract any co-sponsors for this legislation. Id.
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standing to obtain a declaratory judgment from the Supreme
Court regarding any constitutional issue raised by a presidential
signing statement.42
While the Congress ismounting an unprecedented attack on
the presidential signing statement, other commentators are calling
it a "phantom target."" And although many senators were quick
to target Alito's support of signing statements during his
confirmation process, the legislation introduced by Senator44
Specter has thus far been unable to attract any co-sponsors.
With recent executives determined to consolidate presidential
power, and Congress equally determined to dictate to the
executive branch, a political showdown is in the making.
III. ANALYSIS
While the signing statement has been attracting the attention
of many legislators, the U.S. Supreme Court justices have
During Alito's
remained relatively silent on the issue.
confirmation hearings, several senators directly questioned his
involvement in shaping the Reagan Administration's expansionist
use of signing statements. 45 He responded by characterizing his
authorship as "stating the position of the administration" rather
than reflecting his own opinion or agenda.' When pressed to give
his own opinion, he emphasized that his philosophy of statutory
interpretation typically only involved looking to the text of the
statute.7
42. Id.
43. See Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed., 'Signing Statements' Are a Phantom
Target, BOSTON GLOBE, § A, at 9 (Aug. 9, 2006) (indicating he believes that

George W. Bush has used signing statements inappropriately, but that the
objections to such a practice are not related to the constitutionality of the
statements themselves, but rather to the President's failure to use a veto when
appropriate).
44. Levin, supra note 32; Kennedy, supra note 32; Dayton, supra note 32;
Feinstein, supra note 2; Leahy, supra note 2; 152 CONG. REC. S8269 (daily ed.
July 26, 2006) (introduction of legislation with sponsor, Sen. Specter).
45. The Nomination of Judge Samuel A. Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court:
Hearing Before the S.

Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2006) (questions

specifically regarding signing statements posed by Senators Arlen Specter,

Patrick Leahy, and Edward Kennedy).

Though some of the questions were

actually lengthy statements, they pressed Alito to account for his early
opinions as well as explain what his current philosophy regarding the
authority contained within presidential signing statements is, and how that
might affect his decisions as a member of the Supreme Court. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Alito also pointed out that the memorandum he composed for the
Reagan Justice Department raised a number of problems with the use of
signing statements as legislative history, and he claimed that these theoretical
problems would have to be addressed and resolved by the Supreme Court
before signing statements could be used as a source of interpretive authority.
Id. The theoretical issues that he identified in that memorandum included the
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The rest of the Court has had opportunities to directly
address the substance of several presidential signing statements
in decisions issued during the course of the George W. Bush
Administration. Their treatment of those signing statements
reveals the degree to which presidential interpretation is treated
as a source of authority by the judiciary.
A. Affirmative Action and the University of Michigan Cases
1.

The Administration on Affirmative Action

President George W. Bush has issued at least fifteen signing
statements dealing with affirmative action in the six years after
taking office.48 These signing statements have refused to recognize
congressional authority to impose affirmative action policies in a
myriad of governmental settings.4 9 Typically, the statements
challenge the constitutionality of affirmative action policies under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.0 According to
one, "the executive branch shall construe the law in a manner
consistent with a constitutional clause guaranteeing 'Equal

very basic question of what role a President's intent has in the interpretation
of legislation, given that although his approval of legislation has always been
equally important to that of Congress, he has traditionally had a very limited
role in shaping legislation. Id. Alito also raised the difficulties inherent in the
possibility of a direct conflict between congressional and presidential intent;
surmising that if clear congressional intent were to always defeat a
presidential interpretation, presidential power might be equivalent to the
deference traditionally accorded to administrative interpretation. Nomination
of Alito, supra note 45. Although Alito did not suggest a resolution to either of
these issues, he does recommend that the administration embark on a "pilot
program" of moderate scope where a small number of signing statements
containing interpretive statements, along with a clear explanation of the
authority upon which the administration depends, would be issued. Alito,
supra note 14.
48. Savage, supra note 22.
49. Id.
50. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President's
Statement on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (Dec. 17,
2004). The bill at issue, a lengthy reformation of the intelligence community
which, among other things, created the office of Director of National
Intelligence, called in part for the hiring and promotion of women and
minorities in the intelligence field. Part of the motivation to use a signing
statement to address the small part of the bill that amounted to an
implementation of affirmative action policies within the departments under
the intelligence umbrella is that the President would otherwise have to veto a
long, complicated and extremely popular piece of legislation in order to
address his objections to a relatively minor provision. Continually vetoing
complicated, multi-title legislation would effectively paralyze governmental
operations. See Brownell, supra note 29 (discussing the modem context of
complex legislation that presents the President with the difficult choice of
approving a bill over his reservations or vetoing the entire package).
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Protection' for all."5 In other words, the clear position of the Bush
Administration is that Congress cannot implement affirmative
action policies in governmental agencies, because equal protection
is guaranteed under the Constitution. Even more generally, the
Administration believes that any congressional attempt to create
policies regarding federal employment is invalid because, as the
head of the executive branch, the President has the sole authority
to control the agencies of that branch.52 Thus, the President has
two theoretically powerful constitutional arguments supporting
his clearly defined opposition to all federal affirmative action
policies.
In 2003, the Supreme Court heard the cases of Gratz v.
Bollinger' and Grutter v. Bollinger.' These two cases involved
affirmative action admissions policies at the University of
Michigan. In the first case, Jennifer Gratz, a white, female,
Michigan resident, applied to the University of Michigan's College
of Literature, Science, and the Arts and was denied admission."
She was joined by a similarly qualified male student," and
together they represented other undergraduate applicants in a
class action suit. 7 In the second case, Barbara Grutter, also a
white, female, Michigan resident, was denied admission to the
University of Michigan Law School.' She also represented a class
of similar individuals.59 In both of these cases, the plaintiffs sued
51. Press Release, supra note 50.
52. See generally Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 14 (containing a full
treatment of the main principles of the Unitary Executive Theory, as well as
an examination of the historical development of the theory). Several aspects
of the Unitary Executive Theory govern the administration's opposition to
congressional interference in federal hiring practices. Id. The Unitary
Executive not only protects the President's power to control the Executive
Branch, but also to either remove bureaucratic officials or veto their
discretionary actions. Id. Although no President would have the practical
ability to micro-manage all of the departments of the executive branch, he
would theoretically be able to dictate the individual actions, including all
hiring and firing decisions, of the employees of all government agencies. Id.
53. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
54. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
55. Based on Gratz's adjusted high school GPA and ACT score, and her
status as a Caucasian in-state resident, she was placed in a group whose
admissions decision was initially postponed, and eventually denied. Gratz,
539 U.S. at 254. If she had been either an in-state or out-of-state minority
applicant, she would have been placed in a group of immediately accepted
applicants. Id. Gratz eventually enrolled at, and graduated from, the
University of Michigan at Dearborn. Id. at 251.
56. Id.
57. Gratz was joined in her suit by Patrick Hamacher, a white male
resident of Flint, Michigan, who was also denied admission to the University.
After his admissions decision was first postponed, and then ultimately denied,
he attended and graduated from Michigan State University. Id.
58. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
59. Id. at 317.
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the University, alleging that the University had discriminated
against them on the basis of race, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause and other federal statutes.60
The Court
consolidated the two cases for hearing.
The United States Justice Department filed an amicus brief
on behalf of the petitioners in both cases.6' In its brief, the
department repeated and elaborated on the Bush Administration's
expressed views condemning affirmative action.2
The brief
claimed that the justice department, and by extension the
executive branch, had an interest in the case under two mandates:
the responsibility to uphold the Equal Protection Clause in a
public education setting, and also the responsibility to enforce
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits recipients
of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of
race, color, or national origin.' Additionally, the briefs called for a
race-neutral admissions policy that would instead promote
diversity by focusing on factors such as "overcoming disadvantage,
geographic origin . . . volunteer and work experiences, [and]
exceptional personal talents," citing models used by Texas,
Florida, and California.'
2. The CourtResponds to the Administration
The Court directly addressed the Bush Administration's
arguments in lengthy discussions in both cases, which resulted in
a 6-3 decision abolishing the quota system employed by the
undergraduate admissions office,' while a 5-4 majority upheld the
law school's use of race as one factor in admissions decisions.

60. Id.; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 252.
61. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
62. Id. The Solicitor-General and other attorneys within the justice
department authored and filed the briefs with the input and endorsement of
the General Counsel of the Department of Education. Id.
63. Id. at 1-2.
64. Id. at 14-15.
65. Id. at 13-14. The government's amicus brief listed its main legal
arguments in opposition to the University's affirmative action policies. The
brief argued that the University owed all "segments of American society" equal
access to admission, and that the recruitment of highly qualified minority
students is a valid way to guarantee adequate minority representation in a
university population without creating an explicit preference in the
admissions system, rendering the existing system unconstitutional because it
was not necessary. Id. at 13. The brief also contended that the admissions
system used race as a decisive factor rather than just one element that might
benefit a candidate, and that the system had the effect of unduly burdening
innocent third parties by requiring Caucasian applicants to meet higher
objective qualifications than other groups. Id. at 22-24.
66. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251.
67. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
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Both Courts explicitly rejected the Administration's contention
that affirmative action policies violated the Equal Protection
Clause, instead deciding that racial diversity was a compelling
interest that justified the use of race as one aspect in an
admissions decision.' Although the Court found that the overly
mechanistic points system was equivalent to an unconstitutional
quota,69 both cases stand as a reaffirmation of affirmative action
policies as not only constitutional but also beneficial if tailored
narrowly enough to assure the achievement of a university's
compelling interest in diversity. The Court was not influenced by
the President's, and his Administration's, interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause and attacks on the constitutionality of
affirmative action policies.
B. Detainee Treatment and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
Three years later, after the addition of new Chief Justice John
Roberts and new junior Associate Justice Samuel Alito to the
bench, the U.S. Supreme Court heard another case that involved a
signing statement authored by the Bush Administration.
1.

The Detainee TreatmentAct and the Administration

Congress proposed and passed the Detainee Treatment Act
(DTA), also known as the McCain Amendment, as an Amendment
to the Defense Department Budget of 2005.0 In part, the Act
provides that "no person in the custody or under the effective
control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a
Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any treatment or
technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the
United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation.""
The bill was specifically meant to include prisoners being detained
at Guantanamo Bay." It was a bi-partisan effort that was passed
by a vote of 90-9 in December, 2005.73
President George W. Bush signed the department budget into
law at the end of 2005, but he concurrently issued a signing
statement that presented his interpretation of the DTA, as well as
68. Id. at 328; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268-69.
69. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-75.
70. Detainee Treatment Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-158, § 1002, 119 Stat.
2680 (2005). Although after much public debate and controversy the
substance of this enactment was replaced, the Act was current and valid from
December, 2005 until September, 2006. The replacement Act is the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
71. Detainee Treatment Act § 1002.
72. Id.
73. United States Senate, U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress
httpJ/www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll calljlists/votemenu 109
(2005),
1.htm (follow vote number 249 hyperlink). The nine senators who voted

against the bill were all Republicans. Id.
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a Constitutional basis for his objections. 74 The signing statement
reads in part:
noting that section 1005 does not confer any constitutional right
upon an alien detained abroad as an enemy combatant, the
executive branch shall construe section 1005 to preclude the Federal
courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over any existing
or future action, including applications for writs of habeas corpus,
described in section 1005 .

In other words, President Bush does not recognize the ability
of the federal court system to hear cases brought by detainees
under the control of the U.S. Justice Department because he
believes that he has the sole authority to direct the actions of the
members of the executive branch, including the military tribunals,
which are in place for the purpose of hearing detainee
complaints. 7
The text of this signing statement does not mean that the
President intends to disregard the statute.
An anonymous
administration official told the Boston Globe that the President
did recognize his obligation to enforce the amendment.77 However,
74. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President's
Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico,
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006" (Dec. 30, 2005), available at http:l/
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html.
The signing
statement does more than simply comment on the section of the bill that deals
with detainee treatment. It begins with a general acknowledgment of its
support of the bill and continues by addressing several of the fiscal provisions
contained in other areas of the bill, as well as sections legislating the
reorganization of the Department of Defense and the treatment of foreign
intelligence. Id. Throughout the statement, the President reiterated that he
would construe the specific provisions of the bill in a manner that was
consistent with his own constitutional powers, and challenged the ability of
Congress to legislate anything that might encroach on the presidential role
under the separation of powers doctrine. Id. Although he instructed the
executive branch to interpret the legislation as stripping jurisdiction from the
federal court system, the statement did not claim power to influence the
judiciary. Id.
75. Id.

76. This assertion of executive power as commander-in-chief of the military
is consistent with the Unitary Executive. The traditional interpretation of
that theory does not explicitly address the President's power over the armed
forces, which is theoretically a separate constitutional grant, but the
President's position as the head of the executive branch of the government.
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 14.
77. Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 4, 2006. This article went on to suggest that the administration issued a
signing statement which purported to limit the scope and implementation of
the Detainee Treatment Act only after unsuccessfully attempting to suppress
the passage of the McCain amendment, or to convince Congress to soften the
effect of the amendment by exempting the CIA from any provisions limiting
interrogation tactics. Id. The article also claimed that President Bush had
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the official also said that if the amendment conflicted with the
President's responsibility to "defend and protect the country as
commander-in-chief," he would have to reconcile those conflicting
obligations."8 Although the Administration tried to downplay the
impact of the President's signing statement, it was meant as an
assertion of the power to override the legislation if he should
decide that it encroaches on his position as head of the executive
branch.
2.

The Court's Response

The DTA was at issue in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 9
In that case, a Yemeni national, detained at Guantanamo Bay on
terrorist related charges, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a
writ of habeas corpus."
In the decision, the U.S. Supreme Court examined the
legislative history of the DTA in detail. While not specifically
referencing the President's signing statement, the majority
rejected the interpretation presented therein and found that the
President's determination did not justify the departure from
standard procedures governing courts-martial.81 The Court upheld
subject matter 8jurisdiction,
over the President's explicit statement
2
to the contrary.

In his dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and
Alito, specifically criticized the majority for its lengthy discussion
of the DTA's legislative history that "ignor[ed] the President's
signing statement, which explicitly set forth his understanding
that the DTA ousted jurisdiction over pending cases."' However,
threatened to veto the legislation outright. Id.
78. Id.
79. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5185, *30-34 (June
26, 2006).
80. Id.
81. Id. The Court did discuss the legislative history of the Detainee
Treatment Act, and examined it in some detail, perhaps in part because an
amicus brief was filed by Senators John Kyl and Lindsey Graham in support
of the administration's position that detainees did not have the right of habeas
corpus. Brief for Senators John Kyl and Lindsey Graham as Amicus Curiae
for the Respondent, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5185
(June 26, 2006). The senators claimed that Congress had been aware that the
Detainee Treatment Act purported to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction
in hearing cases brought by those detained at Guantanamo Bay, and had
intended to produce that result with the legislation. Id. The majority did not
agree with the Senators' position, and instead ruled that Congress had never
intended to remove jurisdiction from the Supreme Court. Hamdan, 2006 U.S.
LEXIS 5185, at *127.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 134. This part of Scalia's dissent, though, was not a serious
endorsement of the President's signing statement, but rather a response to the
majority's discussion of the legislative history of the act. In fact, Scalia's
dissent, as consistent with his general judicial philosophy, relies first on the

2007]

Signing Statements and the New Supreme Court

1333

even this dissent fell far short of indicating that the signing
statement is a source of authority; rather, it merely showed that
the Justices view it as one factor in determining the relevant
legislative history.
Each of these case studies illustrate that the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the judiciary in general, is fiercely independent. The
President has the opportunity to try to publicize his legislative
interpretation, but in the event that interpretation is challenged
through the court system, it is unlikely that the judiciary will be
influenced by the President's opinion unless his challenge to
congressional authority is valid.
Even with the presence of new Justices John Roberts and
Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court's philosophical approach to
presidential signing statements has not significantly changed.
Rather, the signing statement retains the same position that it has
had in the past - as one of many possible arguments presented to
the Court, but without the force or deference duly awarded to
congressional actions.
IV. PROPOSAL
The rise of the presidential signing statement has been a
steady growth over a period of seventy-five years. However, only
the last four presidential administrations have used the signing
statement so frequently that it is almost a matter of course.' The
practical effect of the inclusion of the signing statement in
U.S.C.C.A.N, as well as other public directories, has been to create
a high degree of transparency in an administration's policies."

explicit text of the statute denying the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the
detainees, rather than supporting or even considering the legislative history in
his analysis. This interpretation happens to match Congress's intent rather
than the President's, although it does not explicitly contradict the signing
statement. Id. at 156-68.
84. Kelley, supra note 10, at Appendix 3.1.
85. Presidential signing statements are widely available to the public,
although not necessarily widely publicized. Each presidential signing statement is issued as a press release by the White House Office of the Press
Secretary, and is available on the White House website. For a recent example,
see Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, President's
Statement on Signing of H.R. 5122, the "John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007" (Oct. 17, 2006) (containing several
constitutional objections to provisions in the legislation which, among other
things, require the President to consult with foreign governments in
developing and carrying out U.S. foreign policy). Additionally, the website
Coherent Babble contains the full text of each signing statement issued by the
Bush Administration along with annotations that provide links to the full text
of the legislation in question, as well as links to other government documents
related to the statements themselves. Coherent Babble, Signing Statements
of George W. Bush, http://coherentbabble.com/signingstatements/TOCindex.
htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
In print form, the full text of every
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Without this regularly issued commentary, the public might not
have access to an administration's interpretation of legislation,
especially if a bill is not particularly newsworthy.' This beneficial
function can be preserved if the President is encouraged to
continue the practice of issuing signing statements, which can be
used to both explain and interpret legislation. The judiciary
should be able to look to a presidential signing statement as one
tool of many in determining the legal interpretation of a statute,
although the signing statement should not have, and does not now
have, the force of law. 7 Additionally, legislation should be
proposed in Congress that provides for immediate judicial review
of the text of a signing statement in certain circumstances, in
order to strengthen the checks and balances which exist between
the branches of government.
A. Signing Statements as an Interpretive Tool
As analyzed above, the judiciary is sufficiently independent

-

presidential signing statement is found in the Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, published by the Office of the Federal Register,
National Archives and Records Administration. For example, to view the
signing statement referenced above, see President's Statement on Signing of
H.R. 5122, the "John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2007," 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1836 (Oct. 23, 2006). Additionally,
the full text of most signing statements is contained in U.S.C.C.A.N., which is
issued monthly in pamphlet form and then reissued as a bound volume after
each session of Congress. Although these sources may not be available in
smaller libraries, certainly the variety of places in which the full text of each
presidential signing statement is available indicates that interested parties
should have no difficulty accessing that information.
86. There is no other presidential form of communication that
approximates the detail or the specificity of a signing statement. The other
regular methods of communication are public remarks, which are reprinted
and released by the White House office of the Press Secretary, presidential
communications to Congress, which usually take the form of a letter, and the
President's weekly radio address. Public addresses are not an appropriate
forum for addressing the technical aspects of whatever legislation the
President has most recently signed, and in the same way a weekly radio
address is meant for public consumption of larger policy issues rather than a
recitation of objections to specific clauses contained within legislation.
Although news conferences may be used to flesh out an administration's
policy, they occur infrequently and depend on the questions presented by
reporters to investigate the President's views. See id. at 1823-65 (summarizing all official communications from the President during any particular
week, including all public remarks, all communications to Congress and to
federal agencies, proclamations, notices, executive orders, meetings with
foreign leaders, and supplementary materials).
87. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (describing the process by
which the Reagan Administration developed a plan to expand the use of
signing statements, and noting that even the members of the justice
department at the time only foresaw the creation of an alternative
interpretation of legislation and not a statement that carried the force of law).
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and intelligent - to be able to objectively analyze a President's
interpretation of specific legislation without being unduly
influenced by any particular administration's political posturing.
Signing statements should not be viewed as part of legislative
history and should not be controlling when interpreting the
meaning of legislative language, as the President's stated
interpretation is not directly related to, or considered in, the
legislative process, and his official involvement in the formation of
legislation is limited to an approval or denial of the bill as a
whole.'
However, signing statements can and should be one
legitimate factor in judicial interpretation, given the same weight
by courts as a convincing piece of scholarship or an amicus brief.
Although the courts are unlikely to agree with a President's
alternate interpretation most of the time, as evidenced by their
refusal to adopt the Bush Administration's viewpoint in either of
the cases discussed above, there are circumstances in which a
President's challenges may be valid. In these situations, a court
should not be barred from considering a President's viewpoint any
more than they should be forced to accept it. The inherent
objectivity of the judiciary ensures that they are suited to serve as
the final arbiter of constitutionality. Indeed, the function of the
court system itself is to interpret the language of a statute
whenever it is challenged.
Therefore, the ability to use a
presidential signing statement in making this interpretive
decision is not an expansion of judicial power, nor does it increase
the power of the executive branch beyond its existing capability to
offer opinions to the court through the filing of a brief. Instead, it
preserves a court's ability to consider all available interpretations
while determining the powers and privileges of the legislative and
executive branches.
B. Immediate JudicialReview
The possibility of abuse presented by signing statements
occurs in the time period between the legislation's enactment and
the conclusion of a legal challenge to the interpretation of the bill
in question. During this time period, the President's interpretation

88. See Brownell, supra note 29, for a full description of the President's role
in the implementation of legislation in today's political climate, including a
discussion of the difficulties inherent in the tension between the President's
role in approving or denying an entire piece of legislation and the practice of
large, multi-section bills through Congress.
Brownell argues that the
President's inability to use a line-item veto hinders his ability to effectively
object to legislation because Congress routinely passes "omnibus" legislation,
which may be the result of months of political negotiation, therefore raising
the stakes and increasing the cost of objecting to a small part of that
legislation. Id.
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directs the implementation of the legislation by the executive
branch.89 This could be seen as de facto veto power over any
legislation that he opposes, because it would take, at minimum, a
period of months for a challenge to work its way through the
judiciary. Although the judiciary retains the ultimate power to
arbitrate any dispute of constitutional authority, a President's
ability to selectively enforce legislation cannot be allowed to
remain unchecked while the court system remains powerless to
resolve the conflict.
In order to prevent such an abuse of power, legislation should
be proposed that provides for immediate judicial review of signing
statements that indicate that the President interprets any section
of a bill as unconstitutionally contrary to his powers as the head of
the executive branch. ° Any such legislation should provide that a
majority of the members in either house of Congress may pass a
resolution to immediately file a declaratory judgment action in the
federal court system to challenge the content of the President's
signing. The declaration from the court should specifically address
the content of the President's signing statement, and provide a
legislative interpretation.
If the President's interpretation is
found to be without merit, the Court would be able to immediately
declare that the President must execute the legislation consistent
with the court's interpretation. Such a provision would eliminate
any time period during which the President's interpretation is
executed exclusively, in conflict with the clear intent of Congress.
An added benefit of immediate judicial review would be that
administrations would be less likely to make expansive claims of
89. See Bumiller, supra note 30 (arguing that President Bush's signing
statements reinterpret congressional action without effective review, since he
directs the actions of the executive branch without any governmental body
having the ability to immediately oversee either that interpretation or course
of action).
90. The legislation that has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Arlen
Specter also contains a section which seeks to provide for judicial review of
signing statements in the form of a declaratory judgment. However, that
provision is rendered functionally irrelevant by the main section of the bill,
which seeks to declare that the judiciary may not use a presidential signing
statement in determining the interpretation of an act of Congress. If a
statement cannot be used in this way, then the court system would have to
declare any challenged signing statement invalid, unless it found that the two
interpretations could co-exist. Furthermore, Senator Specter's proposed
legislation would allow any member of Congress to challenge any signing
statement issued by a President, and not only the ones which contain direct
constitutional challenges or re-interpretations. This provision could lead to
frivolous or politically motivated challenges to signing statements, providing
an illustration that the political power struggle between the Presidency and
Congress works both ways. This provision would also inevitably curtail a
President's use of explanatory signing statements, limiting public access to
information regarding his policies and interpretations. S. 3731, 109th Cong.
(2006).
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unconstitutionality or of encroachment on the principles of
separation of powers. President Bush's signing statements are
often repetitive, and react to legislation on a variety of topics in
the same ways. If signing statements were subject to review, the
courts would be able to settle some of the issues that are typically
raised in signing statements expeditiously and preemptively.
Additionally, any President would be hesitant to issue a
constitutional challenge as a matter of course if he knew that such
a challenge would likely be litigated. Any statement would likely
be carefully considered before it was issued.
In this way,
immediate judicial review could promote a higher quality of
signing statements while preventing an imbalance of power among
the branches of government.
V.

CONCLUSION

The expansive use of signing statements by every President
since Reagan is seen by many critics as troubling.91 However, the
recent media alarm that calls for the elimination of signing
statements outright, coupled with the proposed legislation seeking
to prevent courts from using signing statements as an interpretive
tool,9" is equally troubling. Signing statements have an extensive
history in this country, and that is because they have a legitimate,
useful purpose. Clarification of their exact level of influence over
judicial interpretation and reasoning, along with a system
providing oversight in the form of a judicial review, would preserve
the legitimate uses of signing statements and also limit their
potential for abuse.

91. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (providing examples of
observations from a number of different sources, all of which express concern
about the Bush Administration's frequent use of signing statements and
criticize the content of the statements as being too broad).
92. S. 3731.

